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Abstract
In software engineering, risks are usually considered
and analysed during, or even after, the design of the sys-
tem. This approach can lead to the problem of accommo-
dating necessary countermeasures in an existing design and
possible to reconsider the initial requirements of the sys-
tem. In this paper, we propose a goal-oriented approach for
modelling and reasoning about risks at requirements level.
Risks are introduced and analysed along the stakeholders'
goals and countermeasures are imposed as part of the re-
quirements of the system-to-be. The proposed framework
is based on the Tropos methodology and extends the for-
mal framework with new concepts and qualitative reason-
ing mechanisms to consider risks since the early phases of
the requirements analysis. The risk analysis process is pre-
sented and illustrated with some experimental results.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, in software engineering risk analysis is
used to identify the high risk elements of the project and
provide ways of documenting the impacts of risk mitiga-
tion strategies [15]. Moreover, risk analysis has been shown
important in the software design phase to evaluate critical-
ity of the system [3]. Risks are analysed and necessary
countermeasures are introduced as new functionality of the
software. In order to accommodate these new functional-
ity, the approach envisages the necessity of revising the en-
tire design and possible the initial requirements of the sys-
tem. This can introduce, however, new problems and then
lead to system vulnerabilities. Considering risks since the
early phases of the software development process can pre-
vent such problems and, as effect, contain the costs of the
project. In particular, analysing risks along the stakehold-
ers' needs and objectives, namely before the denition of
the requirements of the software, can introduce good crite-
ria for the analyst to evaluate and choose among different
alternatives.
Goal-oriented requirement engineering is an emerging
research area where the main idea is to put emphasis on
why certain requirements are needed before analysing how
they can be realised. This approach facilitates the analyst
to understand the real goals of the stakeholders and so eval-
uate the different alternatives for their satisfaction. Several
methodologies and frameworks have been presented in lit-
erature, such as KAOS [16], i* [19], GBRAM [2] and Tro-
pos [4].
Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework for analysing
requirements. During early requirements analysis, the re-
quirements engineer identies the domain stakeholders and
models them as social actors, who depend on one another
for goals to be fullled, tasks to be performed, and re-
sources to be furnished. Through these dependencies, one
can answer why questions, besides what and how, regard-
ing system functionality. Answers to why questions ulti-
mately link system functionality to stakeholder needs, pref-
erences and objectives. The methodology analyses goals
by a renement process in which each goal is decomposed
into subgoals and positive/negative contributions are estab-
lished among goals. So for example, the goal of the pro-
duction manager to reduce costs can be OR-decomposed
in use raw materials effectively and reduce labour costs,
and the goal to have an efcient vehicles production plan
contributes positively to the satisfaction of the goal reduce
costs.
Through goal models, the analyst can analyse alterna-
tive solutions for the satisfaction of stakeholders' goals and
choose among them on the base on specic criteria (e.g.,
minimum-cost [8]). However, Tropos, as well as the other
goal-oriented approaches, does not consider risks during the
requirements analysis and it can happen that the cheapest
alternative corresponds to the most risky one. For instance,
suppose that in order to reduce labour costs the production
manager can either buy more efcient machines or reduce
salaries. Of course, buying new machines is costly for the
company and reducing the salaries seems to be the best al-
ternative. However, the reduction of the salaries closely de-
pends on the labour regulation which is issued by the gov-
ernment and that, in some countries, can change frequently
and prevent the possibility of the reduction.
In this paper we propose an extension of the Tropos re-
quirements analysis phase to accommodate risk analysis.
We extended the goal model formal framework introduc-
ing a three layers model, where risks are related to goals
and countermeasures to risks (Section 3). Risks can have
an impact on goals and countermeasures produce an effect
to the mitigation of the risks. A risk analysis process is also
discussed and algorithms for the qualitative analysis are pre-
sented (Section 4). The developed CASE tool is discussed
and shown by experimental results (Section 5). We nally
conclude the paper with related work (Section 6) and a nal
discussion (Section 7).
2 Tropos Goal Analysis
Tropos proposes a formal framework to do requirement
analysis that results in a number of goal models repre-
sented as graphs hG;Ri , where G are goals and R
are relations (decomposition or contribution relations). If
(G1; :::; Gn)
r7¡! G is one of the goal relations in R ,
G1,. . . ,Gn are called as the source nodes andG is the target
node of relation r.
Each goal has two attributes SAT-Sat(G) and DEN-
Den(G), which quantify the value of evidence for the
goal being satised and denied, respectively. The values
of the attributes are qualitatively divided in the range of
f(F )ull; (P )artial; (N)oneg. The attribute is indicated as
goal label and is represented by 6 different satisfaction pred-
icates:
² FS(G), FD(G): there is (at least) full evidence that
goal G is satised (or denied);
² FS(G), PD(G): there is (at least) partial evidence
that goal G is satised (or denied);
² NS(G), ND(G): there is none evidence that goal
G is satised (or denied). They are the same with
T predicate in [7]. It is not mandatory to write these
predicates in formalisation; they could leave implic-
itly.
The predicates state that there is at least a given level of
evidence that the goal is satised (or denied), and we as-
sume that FS(G) ¸ PS(G) ¸ NS(G) and FD(G) ¸
PD(G) ¸ ND(G), with the intended meaning x ¸ y $
x! y.
Qualitative goal analysis in Tropos starts with a num-
ber of top goals and each of them is rened by decomposi-
tion (AND or OR) into subgoals. For example, consider to
model the strategic objectives of a production department
in a vehicles company and suppose to have as main goals
Figure 1. Goal Model for the Vehicle Produc-
tion Department
to reduce costs and to increase quality of vehicles (Fig. 1).
The goal reduce costs (G1) is AND-decomposed into re-
duce resources costs (G3) and have efcient production sys-
tem (G4). Next, reduce resources costs (G3) can be OR-
decomposed into use raw materials effectively (G7), reduce
labour costs (G8), and reduce energy costs (G9), moreover
the goal reduce labour costs (G8) can be satised either by
reduce man-power (G13) or reduce salaries (G14). This de-
composition and renements will continue until the goals
are not considered tangible goals, i.e., when there is an ac-
tor that can full the goal.
Moreover, Tropos goal analysis allows us to model the
inuence of the satisfaction (denial) of a goal to the satisfac-
tion (denial) of other goals. This inuence can be positive
or negative and is graphically indicated by +/¡ contribu-
tion relations. Tropos also has ++ and ¡¡ to express
strong positive contribution and strong negative contribu-
tion, respectively. For example, the goal use monitoring
mechanism (G10) in the production system will help in en-
forcing (+ contribution) the goal of supervising labour
(G16).
There are situations in which we need to model only the
inuence of the satisfaction of a goal on the denial (or the
satisfaction) of another goal. For instance, having high spe-
cialised labour (G15) impacts negatively to the satisfaction
of the goal reduce salaries (G14), but we cannot say any-
thing about what happen if the goal high specialised labour
is denied. In other words we want to separate the effects
of SAT and DEN of the source node on the SAT and DEN of
the target node. To model such situations, Tropos proposes
to use different type of contribution links, namely ¡S ,+S ,
¡D, and +D. In the example, once G15 is satised, G14
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has partial evidence of being denied. Conversely, the denial
of G15 does not infer that G14 will have partial evidence of
being satised.
The semantics of Tropos goal models is expressed by a
set of basic axioms in [7]. For instance, the axioms state
that full satisability (or deniability) implies partial satisa-
bility (or deniability); for an and relation implies that the
full and partial satisability of the target node require re-
spectively the full and partial satisability of all the source
nodes; for a +S relation, the axiom states that only the
partial satisability (but not the full satisability) propa-
gates through a +S relation. Thus, e.g., an and rela-
tion propagates the minimum satisability value (and the
maximum deniability one), while a +S relation propa-
gates at most a partial satisability value. To this extent,
a +S relation can be seen as an and relation with an
unknown partially satisable goal. Similar considerations
hold for the other relations. The axioms show also the rela-
tions monotonically increase the values of satisfaction and
denial among goals, namely SAT and DEN of sources nodes
monotonically increase SAT and DEN of target nodes. Max-
imum function is used to combine different contributions.
Tropos provides also two forms of qualitative reasoning1
on goal models: forward [7] and backward [8] reasoning.
Forward reasoning starts with assigning initial goal labels
(SAT and DEN) to a set of goals (typically leaf goals), then
propagates the labels to the other goals of the model fol-
lowing the relations of the axioms. This form of reasoning
allow us to understand the effects of a particular goal as-
signment over the whole model. It is useful for example
to evaluate whether the assignment allows us to satisfy the
stakeholders' top goals or not. On the other hand, backward
reasoning works in the opposite direction. The reasoning
starts dening desired values of evidence for a number of
goals (typically top goals) and constraints (i.e., the level of
conict that is accepted for the goal model, minimum evi-
dence value of certain goal), then the reasoning tries to nd
an assignment for leaf goals (input goals) that can satisfy
the desired values. The reasoning is enhanced by a number
of criteria (e.g, minimum-cost [8]) to evaluate and choose
among all the possible solutions. Backward reasoning is
useful to nd a possible assignment for leaf goals that satis-
es the stakeholders' top goals.
3 Extending Goal Model for Risk Manage-
ment
As said, Tropos does not consider external events in the
requirements analysis phase and it is not possible to analyse
the effects of unpredictable situations on the stakeholders'
1Actually, Tropos proposes also quantitative reasoning mechanisms [7,
8]
Figure 2. Extended Goal Model
goals. In this section, we extend the Tropos goal model in-
troducing the new primitives event and treatment. Roughly,
a risk is an event that has a negative impact on the satisfac-
tion of a goal, while a treatment is a countermeasure that
can be adopted in order to mitigate the effects of the risk.
In our framework we adopt the WordNet2 denition for
event:
² something that happens at a given place and time;
² a special set of circumstances;
² a phenomenon located at a single point in space-time;
² a consequence; i.e., a phenomenon that follows and is
caused by some previous phenomena.
An event becomes a risk when it produces a negative ef-
fect, whereas it is an opportunity when it produces posi-
tive effects. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [12] has
identied two mandatory properties for risk: likelihood and
severity. Conversely, in our framework we consider like-
lihood as a property of the event, whereas severity/impact
is introduced as a contribution relation (negative/positive)
between an event and a goal. This allows us to model situ-
ations where a single event impacts on more than one goal.
Adopting the idea of three-layers analysis of Defect De-
tection and Prevention (DDP) [6], we consider three differ-
ent layers in goal models Fig. 2. The strategic interests of
the stakeholders are modelled in the rst-layer (goal layer)
using the classical Tropos goal model approach. Subse-
quently, risks and opportunities that result relevant for the
goal layer, are analysed in the second-layer (event layer),
whereas countermeasures to mitigate risks are introduced
and analysed in the third-layer (treatment layer). Graphi-
cally, we represent an event as a pentagon (same representa-
tion used in Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [18]) and a treatment
2http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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as a task (no conceptual distinction between task [4] and
treatment). As for goals, events and treatments can be de-
composed in sub-events and sub-treatments and related by
contribution relations to other goals, events, and treatments.
Intra-layer and inter-layer relations [9] are fully adopted in
the framework to capture all possible situations. The com-
plete meta-model of the goal model is presented in Fig. 2
3.1 Event Layer
Based on the denitions in WordNet, we resume that an
event can be a circumstance (e.g., It rains, There is a
war), the outcome of the satisfaction of a goal or the out-
come of the accomplishment of a task. In our framework,
a risk is dened as an uncertain event with negative impact.
This notion is slightly different from threat [13] in com-
puter security and hazardous condition in reliability engi-
neering [11], which are only dened as a potential circum-
stance that could cause harm or loss and not specifying the
notion of likelihood.
Events can be identied applying different approaches,
such as obstacle analysis in KAOS [17], Taxonomy-base
risk identication [5], or Risk in Finance [10]. Afterwards,
an event is analysed by a decomposition into sub-events un-
til each leaf event can be considered an independent event.
Leaf events are used later to nd proper countermeasures.
An event can inuence more than one goal. So for ex-
ample, in Fig. 3 the event strike (E5) obstructs the satis-
faction of reducing salaries (G14) because in this circum-
stance labours can demand an increment of the salary. On
the other hand, it also obstructs the goal improve produc-
tion chain (G5) since it can compromise and slow down the
production. An event can be considered as a risk for certain
goals and at the same time an opportunity for other goals.
For instance, the event have a new competitor (E7) is a risk
that obstructs the achievement of the goal high specialised
labour (G15) because the competitor can offer better con-
ditions to the labour. However, the event can also be seen
as an opportunity for the goal improve work environment
(G12), because it gives more motivations to the employees
to compete with other companies.
As we already said an event can be characterised by two
properties : likelihood and severity/impact. Likelihood is
dened as how likely an event occurs [1]. In our frame-
work, we represent likelihood by the level of evidence that
supports and prevents the occurrence of the event (SAT and
DEN). We adopt for SAT and DEN of an event the same Tro-
pos meaning of SAT and DEN for a goal.
By impact, we mean the inuence of an event to the goal
fullment. This denition is similar to the denition given
in DDP [6] and to the denition of severity in FMECA [1].
We classify impact as follows:
² Strong Positive(++) - the event occurrence gives a
strong contribution of the goal satisfaction;
² Positive(+) - the event occurrence gives a fair contri-
bution of the goal satisfaction;
² Negative(¡) - the event occurrence gives a fair con-
tribution of the goal denial;
² Strong Negative(¡¡) - the event occurrence gives a
strong contribution of the goal denial.
Since the effect of an event obstructs a goal only when it
occurs (i.e., denial of an event does not give any impacts),
in our model we use only rS relations, i.e., ++S , +S , ¡S ,
and ¡¡S , between an event and goals.
Figure 3. Extended Goal Model for the Vehicle
Production Department
3.2 Treatment Layer
Once the events have been analysed, the analyst identi-
es and analyses the countermeasures to be adopted in order
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to mitigate the risks. The mitigation of a risk can be realised
in two different ways: reducing the likelihood or reducing
the impact. However, in Tropos goal model it is not possi-
ble to model a relation between a node and a relation (only
between nodes), so in this paper we do not consider the re-
duction of the impact as a possible mitigation. This will be
part of our future work.
Similarly to goals and events, for countermeasures we
use SAT and DEN to represent the evidence that supports and
prevents the action. A countermeasure has effect on the
event layer, and in particular over risks. We represent the
effect of a countermeasure as a relation, where its strength
is expressed by the sign of the contribution relations. As for
events, we are interested to the propagation of the evidence
for the success of a countermeasure (SAT) and therefore we
limit the relations between countermeasures and events to
rS relations. A countermeasure mitigates a risk when it
adds (propagates) evidence for its denial.
In our model we also allow for relations between the
treatment layer and the goal layer. This is useful to model
situations where a countermeasure adopted to mitigate a
risk has also a contribution (especially negative) to some
goals. For instance in Fig. 3, the countermeasure create a
labour association (T2) can mitigate the likelihood of the
event strike (E5)  of course this is not always true. How-
ever, the association can have a better bargaining power
w.r.t. the individual worker and obtain an increment of the
salaries. This produces a negative effect on the satisfaction
of the goal reduce salaries (G14).
3.3 Meta-model
Table 1 resumes all the possible relations among goals,
events, and treatments. For instance, the possible rela-
tions form an event to other events are decomposition and
SAT contribution relations. Basically, all objects (Goal,
Event, Treatment/Task) can be operated with all type of
decomposition and contribution relations among the ob-
jects in the same layer. Moreover, the only relation that
can be used across the layers is the contribution relation.
For events and treatments, there are limitations in the type
of the contribution relations (only SAT-Relation; rS 2
f++S ;+S ;¡¡S ;¡Sg) as shown in the meta-model rep-
resented in Fig. 4. In the following we describe some situ-
ations that could be modelled with cross layer contribution
relations 3:
goal! event to model that a goal increases/reduces the
occurrence of an event. For instance, the goal give big
annual bonus can reduce the likelihood of strike;
goal! countermeasure to model that a goal sup-
ports/prevents the countermeasure accomplishment.
3Including impact-contribution and effect-contribution
XXXXXXXSource
Target Goal Event Treatment
Goal Decomp., Cont. Cont. Cont.
Event SAT Cont. Decomp., SAT Cont. SAT Cont.
Treatment SAT Cont. SAT Cont. Decomp., Cont.
Table 1. Relations in the Extended Goal
Model
Decomposition r 2 fand; org, Contribution r 2 f++;+;¡¡;¡g, SAT
Contribution rS 2 f++S ;+S ;¡¡S ;¡Sg
For instance, the achievement of the goal have a close
partnership with the oil company helps to manage oil
supply in the company;
event! goal to model risk, namely the impact of event on
the goal satisfaction. For instance, the event oil price
raise can obstruct the satisfaction of the goal reduce
energy costs;
event! treatment to model the inuence of the occur-
rence of an event on the countermeasure accomplish-
ment. For example, the event gulf war can make the
oil very precious s.t. the oil company feels no need to
have partnership with any end-customers;
treatment! goal to model the side effect (negative or
positive) of a countermeasure on the goal layer. For
example, the countermeasure have a supply manage-
ment system has a positive impact to the satisfaction of
the goal use raw materials efciently.
treatment! event to model the effect of a countermea-
sure to the mitigation of a risk. For example, having
a good managing oil supply can mitigate the risk oil
price raise;
4 Risk Analysis
As already discussed in the introduction, we intend to
support the analyst in evaluating different requirements al-
ternatives with respect to risk. In this section, we describe
the methodological process and the qualitative reasoning
mechanisms that are used in the different steps of the pro-
cess.
The analysis process is described in the Algorithm 1 and
consists of the following three steps:
1. nd the alternative solutions (line 2-3),
2. evaluate each alternative against the relevant risks
(line 8-10)
3. assess the countermeasures to mitigate the risks
(line 11-16).
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Goal
Treatment
Event
Contribution
AND/OR Decomposisition
OpportunityRisk
Impact
Goal Contribution
Effect
Positiv SAT Cont.
DEN Contribution
Negative SAT Cont.
SAT Contribution
1..*
subtreatement
root treatment
1..*
subevent
1..*
subgoal
Contributes to
Contributes to
Contributes to
root goal
Contributes to
Contributed by
Contributed by
Contributed by
Contributed by
Contributes to
Contributes to
Contributes to
root event
Figure 4. Meta-model of the Extended Goal
Model
The process starts taking in input the extended goal
model and a set of desired values for top goals (i.e., sat-
isfaction values-SAT and acceptable risk values-DEN), and a
number of goals as possible candidates for the nal solution
(input goals). For instance, we may desire to fully satisfy
G1 (Sat(G1)=F) without any risk (Den(G1)=N).
Backward Reasoning (line 2) generates a set of pos-
sible assignment values for the input goals that can satisfy
the desired values. We use the standard Tropos backward
reasoning limited to the goal layer (i.e., not considering the
relations with the other two layers) and not considering any
constraints. So for instance, in order to fully satisfy G1 we
can either fully satisfy fG7; G4g, fG13; G4g or fG14; G4g.
The analyst chooses a subset of the alternatives on the
basis of a certain criteria (i.e., minimum-cost [8], softgoals)
called candidate solution (line 3). The rest of the process
will be limited to the analysis of this subset. For instance,
the analyst can decide to choose the alternatives fG13; G4g
and fG14; G4g considering the goal use raw materials (G7)
is too expensive.
Each candidate solution is now evaluated against
risks and then necessary countermeasures are intro-
duced (line 4-18). First, the analyst checks whether
the candidate solution needs countermeasures to ob-
tain the desired values in the top goals. If not the
candidate solution is added directly to the solution and
its cost is calculated (line 6). Otherwise, countermeasures
must be introduced in the candidate solution (line 8-16).
So for example, evaluating fG13; G4g we see from Fig. 3
that there is no risk associated to them so we do not need
any countermeasure. It is different for fG14; G4g.
In order to dene the countermeasures, we rst need
to calculate the risk values that are acceptable for the
stakeholders. In other words, we need to nd the maxi-
mum assignable values of risk that produce an acceptable
DEN value for top goals. So for example, in our exam-
ple we need to nd a set of countermeasures able to mit-
igate risks s.t. Den(G1)=N. To do this we need to con-
sider only the relevant risks for the candidate solution,
namely risks that have an impact on the input goals
and goals reachable from them by decomposition (re-
lated goals). For instance, since the related goals of
fG14; G4g are fG14; G8; G3; G4; G1gwe consider only the
risks fE4; E5g.
Algorithm 1 Risk Analysis Process
Ensure: analyse risk for each alternative solutions and nd necessary
countermeasures to ensure the satisfaction of top goals.
Require: goal model hG;Ri , label array top goals, node array in-
put goals, label array events
1: solution array solution fsolution that has already encompassed risks
and necessary countermeasuresg
2: alt solutionÃBackward Reasoning(hG;Ri ;nil;
top goals; input goals)
3: candidate solutionÃSelect Can Solution(candidate solution)
falt solution µ candidate solutiong
4: for all Si 2 candidate solution do
5: if Satisfy(hG;Ri ; top goals; hSi; events;nili) then
6: add(solution,hSi;nill; Calc Cost(Si;nil)i)
7: else
8: boolean array Related GoalsÃ
Related Goals(hG;Ri ; Si)
9: labelsÃStandard Forward Reasoning(hG;Ri ; Si)
10: acc eventsÃCalc Event(labels; related goals; events)
11: nec treatmentÃBackward Reasoning(hG;Ri ; events;
acc events; avail treatment)
12: for all Tj 2 nec treatment do
13: if Satisfy(hG;Ri ; top goals; hSi; events; Tji) then
14: add(solution,hSi; Tj ; Calc Cost(Si; Tj)i)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
Standard Forward Reasoning (line 9) is used to
propagate the input values of the candidate solution in the
model and so evaluate the impact of the risk. Once we have
an assignment for all the goals of the model we can cal-
culate the acceptable values for the event (i.e., values that
can still satisfy the desired top goals). This is done by the
Calc Event Algorithm 5. We illustrate it later.
Backward reasoning is again applied (line 11) to nd
possible treatments that can guarantee the acceptable risk
(acc event). Of course, we can have more than one pos-
sible combination of treatments. For instance, dening
Sat(E4)=P, Den(E4)=F and Sat(E5)=F, Den(E5)=F as
acceptable values for risk, backward reasoning results fT5g
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hhhhhhhSat(E)
Den(E)
Full Partial
Full Sat(E) = N,Den(E) = N Sat(E) = P,Den(E) = N
Partial Sat(E) = N,Den(E) = P Sat(E) = N,Den(E) = N
Table 2. Conict Resolution for Events
or fT6g as possible treatments.
Finally (line 12-16), each set of treatments are evaluated
with respect to the initial desired values (indeed, there could
be the case that a treatment has negative contribution di-
rectly to the goal layer) and the affordable costs. To do this
we use again the Satisfy algorithm (line 13) that basically
consists of the following three steps:
1. the input values for goal, events and treatments are
propagated over the whole model;
2. conicts in the event layer are solved ;
3. the input values for goals, treatments, events (as results
of step 2) are propagated excluding incoming relations
to events.
For the three steps, we use the
New Forward Reasoning (Algorithm 2), which is
a revised version of the algorithm presented in [7]. The
main difference is that here we extend the propagation
to the event and the treatment layer and we introduce
the conict resolution step. As discussed in the previous
section, the inuence of a risk on a goal depends on the
SAT value of the risk and a mitigation corresponds to
the increment of the level of the DEN. For example, the
impact of E5 on the goal G14 depends on the SAT value
(e.g.,Sat(E5)=F), and the effect of T5 onG14 is to increase
the DEN value of E5 (e.g.,Den(E5)=F). A countermeasure
is effective when it is able to generate a conict between
SAT and DEN in the risk. For example, after taking T5 there
is a conict in E5 (i.e., Sat(E5)=F and Den(E5)=F). The
conict resolution step allows us to separate the effects of
the countermeasures on the goal layer from the impact of
the risks. Table 2 presents the conict resolution rules we
adopted.
Algorithm 2 New Forward Reasoning
Ensure: propagate evidence to the goal model
Require: goal model hG;Ri , label array initial
1: resolutionÃfalse
2: pre resÃ
Label Propagation(hG;Ri ; initial; resolution)
3: post resÃResolve Conflict(hG;Ri ; initial; pre res)
4: resolutionÃtrue
5: resultÃLabel Propagation(hG;Ri ; post res; resolution)
6: return result
Calc Event algorithm (Algorithm 5) basically does the
reverse of conict resolution and distinguishes between risk
Algorithm 3 Label Propagation
Require: goal model hG;Ri , label array initial, boolean resolution
1: label array current, old
2: current = initial
3: while old 6= current do
4: oldÃcurrent
5: for allNi 2 G do
6: if not (resolution and Is Event(Ni)) then fchecking
whether conict resolution has already applied at events or notg
7: current[i]ÃUpdate Label(i; hG;Ri ; old)
8: end if
9: end for
10: end while
11: return current
Algorithm 4 Update Label
Require: int i, goal model hG;Ri , label array old
1: for all Rj 2 R s.t. target(Rj) = Ni do
2: satij = Apply Rules Sat(Ni; Rj ; Old)
3: denij = Apply Rules Den(Ni; Rj ; Old)
4: end for
5: return fmax(max array(satij); Old[i]:sat);
max(max array(denij); Old[i]:den)g
Algorithm 5 Calc Event
Ensure: calculate acceptable value of risks s.t the input goals can satisfy
top goals
Require: label array goals, label array events, boolean array re-
lated goals
1: acceptable eventsÃevents
2: for all Bi 2 related goals do
3: if Bi then
4: for all (Rj 2 R s.t. target(Rj) = goalsi) and
Is Event(source(Rj)) do
5: nodeÃsource(Rj)
6: kÃNode Index(source(Rj))
7: if (Rj 2 f¡S ;¡¡Sg) and goalsi:den < node:sat then
friskg
8: if goalsi:den = N and node:sat = F then
9: acceptable eventsk .denÃF
10: else if (goalsi:den = N and node:sat = P ) or
(goalsi:den = P and node:sat = F ) then
11: acceptable eventsk .denÃP
12: end if
13: else if (Rj 2 f+S ;++Sg) and goalsi:sat > node:sat
then fopportunityg
14: if goalsi:sat = P and node:sat = N then
15: acceptable eventsk .satÃP
16: else if goalsi:sat = F then
17: acceptable eventsk .satÃF
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end if
22: end for
23: return acceptable events
7
Figure 5. Risk Analysis Tool
and opportunity events, line (8-12) and line(14-18), re-
spectively. For example, since we want no risk on G14
(Den(G14)=N) butE4 andE5 produce a partial denial, we
need to introduce countermeasures so create a conict s.t.
E4 and E5 do not impact onG14. In this case, Calc Event
produces the acceptable values of risk Den(E4)=P and
Den(E5)=F to neutralise the Sat(E4)=P and Sat(E5)=F.
As nal result of the process we obtain all the possible
solutions (among the candidate solution) that can satisfy
the initial requirements and costs associated to them. Now,
the analyst can decide which solution to adopt.
5 Tool and Experimental Results
In this section, we briey present the tool we have devel-
oped and some experimental results obtained with it.
The tool is an extension of the Goal Reasoning Tool4
(GR-Tool) developed within the Tropos project. Basically,
the tool (Fig. 5) is graphical tool in which it is possible
to draw the extended goal models and run the algorithms
and tools for (standard and new) forward and backward rea-
soning. The algorithms presented in Section 4 have been
fully developed in JAVA and are embedded in the tool. For
their implementation we started from the GR-Tool reason-
ing mechanisms and we have re-implemented them intro-
ducing the necessary modications as described in Sec-
tion 4. For more details about the GR-Tool and its extension
we suggest to visit the Tropos web page.
4http://sesa.dit.unitn.it/goaleditor/
Input Goal Cost S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
G04: Have Eff. Prod. Sys. 6 X X X X X X X X
G06: Test Vehicles 4 X X X X X X X X
G07: Use Raw Materials Eff. 4.5 X X
G09: Reduce Energy Costs 3 X X
G10: Use Mon. Mechanism 5 X X X X X X X X
G12: Improve Work Env. 6 X X X X X X X X
G13: Reduce Man-Pow. by Mach. 9 X X
G14: Reduce Salaries 3.5 X X
G15: High Specialized Lab. 7 X X X X
G16: Supervise Lab. Tightly 3.5 X X X X
Total Cost 27.5 28 29 31 31.5 32.5 33.5 37
Table 3. Cost of Alternative Solutions
To test our approach and its implementation we run a
number of experiments for the case of the Production De-
partment of a Vehicles Company presented in Fig. 3.
Table 3-5 summarise an example of these results. Sup-
pose we want to obtain a partial satisfaction of goal G1 (re-
ducing cost), a fully satisfaction of G2 (increasing quality
of vehicles), and avoid any risk on them. So we have as in-
put fSat(G1)=P, Sat(G2)=F,Den(G1)=N,Den(G2)=Ng.
Executing Backward Reasoning we nd a set of possi-
ble solutions (as reported in Table 3) and we select among
them the cheapest one S1. The total cost of each solution is
calculated summing up the costs of the single input goals.
Of course, other criteria can be adopted for the selection
of the solution. As discussed in [8], for instance we could
also evaluate the effects of the solution over some qualities
(softgoals). Forward reasoning is applied then to calculate
the effects of the selected solution to the other goals of the
model (column Goal-Out Table 4).
Now, let suppose we have evidence about the occurrence
of some of the events and want to see the impact of them
on the goal layer. For example, considering the event as-
signment reported in column Event-In (i.e., Sat(E2)=P,
Sat(E4)=P, Sat(E5)=F, Sat(E6)=P, Sat(E7)=P), we ob-
tain that (Event-Out) top goals G1 and G2 are both par-
tially satised and denied. In order to re-obtain the desider-
ate values for top goals we need to nd necessary treatments
able to mitigate the risks. There are four possible counter-
measure sets that could be taken to mitigate the risks (see
Table 5) and the total cost of countermeasures can be cal-
culated summing up the single cost of input treatments. In
this experiment, we adopt C2 (i.e., Sat(T4)=P, Sat(T5)=F)
based on their costs and their side effects. Even C2 is the
most expensive, it is worth enough compared with T4 pos-
itive contribution to G7 and both treatments do no agitate
the risks (conversely, T6 triggers the risk E4). Finally, the
tool generates the nal conguration with input S1 and C2
(in column Treatment-Out) where our desired values for
top goals are again obtained.
Let suppose we take the second cheapest solution S2.
The relevant-risks for this alternative solution areE4, E5,
E6, and E7. Consequently, the countermeasures that are
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Goal Event Treat.
In Out In Out Out
S S D S S D S D
E01: Oil Price Raise - - - - P - - -
E02: Oil Stock Manipulation - - - P P - P -
E03: Gulf War - - - - - - - -
E04: Inc. Min. Salary Policy - - - P P - P -
E05: Strike - - - F F P - -
E06: Inc. Unemployment Rate - - - P P - P -
E07: Having Competitor - - - P P - P -
G01: Reduce Costs - P - - P P P -
G02: Increase Quality of Vehicles - F - - F P F -
G03: Reduce Resources Costs - P - - P P P -
G04: Have Eff. Prod. System P P - P P - P -
G05: Improve Production Chain - F - - F P F -
G06: Test Vehicles F F - F F - F -
G07: Use Raw Materials Efciently - - - - - - P -
G08: Reduce Labour Costs - - - - P P P P
G09: Reduce Energy Costs P P - P P P P -
G10: Use Monitoring Mechanism F F - F F - F -
G11: Improve Labour Efciency - F - - F - F -
G12: Improve Work Environments F F - F F - F -
G13: Reduce Man-Power by Machine - - - - - - - -
G14: Reduce Salaries - - - - P P P P
G15: High Specialised Labour - - - - - P - P
G16: Supervise Labours Tightly F F - F F - F -
T01: Manage Oil Supply - - - - - - P -
T02: Create Labour Association - - - - - - F -
T03: Have Partnership with Oil Comp. - - - - - - - -
T04: Have Supply Chain Mgmt Sys - - - - - - P -
T05: Create Local Labour Association - - - - - - F -
T06: Joint with National Labour League - - - - - - - -
Table 4. SAT-DEN values in Risk Analysis of S1
Treatment Input Cost S1 S2
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
T03: Have Partnership with Oil Comp. 6 X X
T04: Have Supply Chain Mgmt Sys 8 X X
T05: Create Local Labour Association 6 X X X
T06: Joint with National Labour League 5 X X X
Total Cost 12 14 11 13 6 5
Table 5. Cost of Possible Treatments
necessary to be taken are T5 or T6. Among the two, even if
more costly, T5 results to be better than T6 since it does not
have any effects on the events' occurrence (T6 has a +S
contribution on E4). Comparing the alternatives, we can
conclude taking S2 and C5 is cheaper than S1 and C2 and
moreover S2 is less risky than S1 (i.e., the risks of S2 ½ the
risks of S1). Similar consideration can be done for the other
solutions.
6 Related Work
The most relevant works in literature that have similar-
ities with our approach are KAOS and DDP . We briey
discuss them in the following.
KAOS [16] is the methodology that provides a specica-
tion by capturing why, who, and when aspects in addition to
what aspect in requirements. KAOS, moreover, has already
been extended beyond goals, by dening obstacles which
can be seen as boundaries in requirement analysis. An ob-
stacle is dened as an undesirable behaviour to the strate-
gic interests of stakeholders which can be used to model
the risk. In [16], they demonstrate how to derive the ob-
stacles from the goal structure and to ensure the complete-
ness of obstacles with respect to the goal structure and its
domain. This technique assumes a complete knowledge to
dene the domain of the goal, which is hardly to meet in the
reality. Conversely, Tropos denes the axioms as at least
premises which assume there are not complete knowledge
to dene the number of evidence. The methodology, also,
introduces the guidance for dening obstacle resolution to
mitigate and, possibly, eliminate the obstacle. Though we
can represent a risk as an obstacle, two mandatory proper-
ties of risk (likelihood and severity) are still missing. How-
ever, the obstacle concept and all related analysis (obstacle
identication, obstacle resolution) could be used as a basis
for the further enhancement of our framework.
DDP [6] is a model that is developed and applied in Jet
Propulsion Lab. and NASA. DDP consists of three layers
model (Objectives, Risks, Mitigation). In this model, each
objective has a weight to represent its importance. A risk
has a likelihood of occurrence and a mitigation has a cost for
accomplishment (namely resource consumption). Severity
of the risk is represented by impact relation between objec-
tive and risk. Moreover, DDP model species how to com-
pute the level of objectives achievement and the cost of mit-
igation5 from a set of taken mitigation. This calculation al-
lows us to evaluate the impact of taken countermeasures and
thus supports the decision making process. The DDP model
also allows us to work together with other quantitative tools
(FMECA [1], FTA [18]) to model and assess risk/failure.
In [6], they demonstrate how to integrate FMECA and FTA
into DPP model. There are some differences between the
concept of objective [6] and the concept of goal in goal-
oriented requirement engineering [4, 16, 19, 2]. In goal-
oriented, the goal has a structure (e.g., tree, graph). Con-
versely, DDP depicts objective (also risk and mitigation) as
a solitary object (i.e., there is no relation among objects in
the same layer). This feature could limit in modelling sit-
uations (e.g., domino effect [14]) in which the occurrence
of a risk can increase/decrease the likelihood of other risks.
DDP model allows us only to establish relations between
layers (i.e., risks to goals, mitigation to risk) which is not
enough to represent all possible situations. For example,
there could be cases where a treatment affect also the sat-
isfaction of some objective. Our framework adopts and en-
hances the idea of three-layers model.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a framework to model
and reason about risk within the requirements engineering
5objective restoration categories as one kind of mitigation action
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process. We have adopt and extended the Tropos goal mod-
elling framework and proposed qualitative reasoning algo-
rithms to analyse risk during the process of evaluation and
selection of alternatives. However, our approach has some
limitations that we want to overcome as part of our fu-
ture work. Specically, as discussed in the paper our mod-
elling framework supports only relationships between nodes
(goals, events, tasks) and this could be a limitation when we
want to model situations where a treatment mitigates the
risk reducing its impact on the goal layer. In other words,
we need to extend the framework introducing the possibility
to establish relations also between nodes and arcs. Another
limitation is related to the fact that in our framework the val-
ues for SAT and DEN can only increase monotonically and it
is not possible to model the fact that an event decreases the
evidence for the satisfaction of a goal. Finally, as done for
goal models we want to propose also quantitative reasoning
mechanisms where evidence is expressed in term of proba-
bility.
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